French election: no one won

Following a significant defeat in the European elections on 9 June, the French President announced the dissolution of the National Assembly, the lower house of Parliament, and called for snap legislative elections on 30 June and 7 July 2024.

This action is permitted under Article 12 of the French Constitution, which allows the President to dissolve the National Assembly before the end of its term. The President exercises this power independently, without needing the approval of the Prime Minister or the government. This explains why the decree dissolving the National Assembly is signed solely by the President and simply states that the Assembly is dissolved. This also means that the Government is not held politically accountable for this decision.

This type of choice has entailed important institutional consequences.

Generally, it can be argued that by scheduling parliamentary elections in 2024, three years before the presidential elections, Emmanuel Macron has disrupted the synchronicity established in 2002. At that time, the presidential mandate was reduced from seven to five years to align the parliamentary and presidential elections, precisely to avoid situations like the current one – an irony of history.

Specifically, the first consequence of the dissolution of the National Assembly has been the early and immediate interruption of the mandates of the members of parliament. All ongoing work within the Assembly has been terminated: the legislative texts under discussion have become obsolete and the fact-finding missions or committees of inquiry have ceased. Current legislation, such as the end-of-life bill, has been simply suspended and may be revisited by the new Assembly, starting from scratch in the parliamentary procedure.

Secondly, the dissolution necessitates the organization of parliamentary elections within "at least twenty days and at most forty days". Consequently, Macron announced, at the same time as the dissolution, that the elections would take place on 30 June and 7 July. The decree convening the electors and outlining the electoral operations was published in the Official Journal alongside the decree dissolving the Assembly. As a result, an electoral campaign has begun, constrained by very short deadlines.

The "cohabitation" between a President of the Republic and a National Assembly with a political majority of a different colour is an option the French constitution does not rule out, although the 2002 reform aimed at making such a scenario less likely.

The President is responsible for the "regular functioning of public authorities". This includes appointments of the Prime Minister and ministers, presiding over the weekly Council of Ministers, conducting diplomacy, calling legislative referendums or special sessions of Parliament, and exercising the right of pardon. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister oversees the collective direction of the government and holds regulatory power over parliamentary procedures, introducing bills, and making budget decisions. Although the President is often referred to as the "master of clocks", the Prime Minister is the master of administration, budget, and normative flow.

While the President is vested with powers that can be exercised without countersigning, such as the dissolution of Parliament, the appointment of members of the Constitutional Council, or that of the Prime Minister, other powers are shared with the government, for example in military matters, between the "Chief of the Armed Forces" and the "Head of National Defence".

In the event of cohabitation, the constitutional distribution of powers remains unchanged, but the center of gravity within the executive shifts to Matignon, the seat of the government. It is no longer the President who drives the agenda; instead, the Prime Minister assumes the leadership of administration. The President retains the exercise of purely sovereign prerogatives: representing France, promulgating laws, signing treaties, deciding on referendums, dissolving the National Assembly, and authorizing military interventions abroad (though the latter cannot be done unilaterally). However, the President loses the general initiative of political action, transitioning from a position of concentrated power and leadership in government and public affairs to a role focused on "arbitration" as defined by Article 5 of the French Constitution.

Additionally, Article 8, Paragraph 2 of the French Constitution stipulates that the President appoints other members of the Government based on the Prime Minister’s proposal. Outside of cohabitation, this "proposal" often boils down to the acceptance of the President’s choices, with the Prime Minister finding it difficult to oppose, despite occasional press reports of resistance or negotiations. During cohabitation, however, the "proposal" effectively becomes a decision. The power of resistance shifts from the Prime Minister to the President, who retains a residual right to control the allocation of certain portfolios, such as defense and foreign affairs. Nonetheless, the President is bound by the choices dictated by the majority.

Although dissolutions are rare in parliamentary regimes, especially under the Fifth Republic, and even more so after the 2002 constitutional reform aligning legislative and presidential terms, France has experienced periods of "cohabitation" that led to the use of Article 12 of the French Constitution.

In this regard, the dissolutions of 1981 and 1988, both initiated by President François Mitterrand the day after his election to secure a majority for his program, share enough similarities to be considered a distinct category. However, the outcomes of these dissolutions differ significantly from Macron’s decision.

The 1981 dissolution resulted in a so called "pink wave" in the Assembly, securing an absolute majority for socialists and enabling President Mitterrand to implement his reforms. In contrast, the 1988 dissolution produced only a relative majority for the party of the President. Additionally, the reference to the "Gaullist practice" of dissolving the National Assembly overlooks that the 1962 dissolution followed a government overthrow, and the 1968 dissolution was a response to the events of "May 68". Lastly, the 1997 dissolution by President Jacques Chirac is particularly remembered as a rare example of a failed dissolution which paved the way for cohabitation until 2002, the longest in the Fifth Republic.

The dissolution decided by Emmanuel Macron shows unique characteristics that make it incomparable to the mentioned precedents. Firstly, the dissolution has followed an election to the European Parliament. While the President also cited "disorder" in parliamentary debates, his decision to dissolve in response to the European elections has been unprecedented. He warned of the risks posed by a victory for anti-EU radical right parties and he believed that these intermediate elections, though not strictly national, created a crisis that could only be resolved by "giving back to the French the choice of our parliamentary future". This decision had an immediate and dramatic impact, as the announcement to dissolve the Assembly was made swiftly, and the election schedule was set within the shortest time frame allowed by the Constitution.

This move has also affected parliamentary coalitions and the economy. Macron’s move brings back the right-left divide. For the first time, the Republicans, heirs of Gaullism, were to be allied with Marine Le Pen, the champion of the far right. This unprecedented initiative, announced by the party’s president Eric Ciotti, sparked a storm of reactions and led to a split in the party. Ciotti has been challenged by various leaders demanding his resignation, while Minister Bruno Le Maire and former Prime Minister Edouard Philippe have "extended their hand" to Republicans opposing the alliance with Le Pen’s National Rally.

The French economy is also having a hard time: the Paris Stock Exchange has fallen since the European elections, and financial markets are going through a period of major turbulence related to post-election political uncertainty. In fact, the economic programs of the main opposition parties are raising concerns for investors. The absence of a clear majority and the contrasting political programmes of the various parties provoke fears of economic and financial upheaval.

Overall, it is very apparent that each dissolution is the result of a calculated political strategy. In this case, Macron’s tactic might have been aimed at generating a new momentum to complete his five-year term. He banked on the possibility that a far-right government might become unpopular ahead of the 2027 presidential election, thereby reducing the likelihood of a Marine Le Pen presidency. In this respect, he didn’t have much choice to regain control. He had already upset his ministerial organization with the unexpected appointment of Gabriel Attal on 9 January, he had mobilized the constitutional powers on the occasion of the last legislative projects (such as the pension reform and the immigration law) and, for weeks, he had multiplied media interventions to explain the meaning of his action. Consequently, he had only three options: to stand up to European elections failure, hold a referendum, or dissolve the National Assembly.

Almost no one expected to see the far right lose. Thanks to the French electoral system, the second round of the legislative election saw the emergence of various political forces, resulting in some unexpected shifts. This led to a different outcome than anticipated.

Between the first and the second rounds, Marine Le Pen’s vote count remained around ten million. This number allowed the National Rally to lead in the first round but only secure third place in the second round. While this result was certainly unexpected, it was not contested by any political party.

In France, the electoral rules are established by a law introduced by Charles de Gaulle seventy years ago. This law had two main objectives: to ensure clear outcomes and to provide a strong mandate to those governing the country.

However, achieving this second goal may now be more challenging. The coalition formed to oppose the extreme right consists of a diverse group of Communists, Socialists, Greens and Mélenchon’s radical left party LFI, who have historically been at odds to one another. It’s no surprise that Jordan Bardella, the presumptive Prime Minister if the National Rally had won, described this new union as "the alliance of dishounor". This new alliance might only delay the extreme right’s victory by three years.

Moreover, the President might face political pressure to resign. In France, a dissolution has never affected the President’s mandate so far. This is largely because Emmanuel Macron’s predecessors, while expressing preferences and encouraging voter support, always avoided fully engaging in the electoral campaign. However, this time, the President announced that he would actively participate in the campaign to revive his government, stating he would "make clear the direction that he believes is right for the nation". So, will Macron remain the French President after not losing but also not winning the early elections he alone decided to call? Will the new Assembly last for five years, or will the newly elected President in 2027 dissolve it the day after the election, as François Mitterrand did in 1981? What will the next three political years look like in France?

In light of these dilemmas, it is clear that dissolution is a tool with unpredictable consequences. The future of French politics will be shaped by the coalition that leads France over the next three years. The victorious alliance must establish clear objectives and appoint a new Prime Minister to succeed Gabriel Attal. According to Article 12 of the Constitution, the new Assembly will convene automatically "on the second Thursday following its election", which is 18 July, to elect its bureau and form parliamentary groups. Several options are possible, none is politically straightforward. Macron has succeeded in impeding a far-right majority for the time being and in securing some stronger legitimacy to his presidency for the three years to come. Whether this will suffice to produce a consistent and effective majority in Parliament is a different pair of shoes. The snap elections also prompt further considerations on the viability of the French (hyper)presidential system, although it is very unlikely that constitutional reforms can take place under such tense and unstable political circumstances.