Ok, Zoomer: is Gen Z shifting right?

In June 2024, this time having moved from sunny Bologna to even sunnier Bolzano/Bozen, I once again watched young voters across Europe choose the far-right – in sharp contrast to how they voted five years prior.

The most striking example of the surge in young support for the far-right is undoubtedly the success of the Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National (RN) among voters in the 18 to 34 age group. Once considered unpalatable and obscene, the RN has managed to rebrand and charm the French youth with the help of Jordan Bardella’s charisma. Although voting turnout for the 18-34 age group was only at 52.8% this year, many across Europe watched incredulously as the RN managed to secure 31.8% of the votes cast by the under 34s. This is a very different picture than five years ago, when 41% of young French voters expressed intention to vote for left-wing and green parties.

In a very similar vein, Germany has also seen the gradual normalization of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party, which used to be unanimously considered a fringe and extremist fascist party – and no real ‘alternative.’ However, they have been steadily currying the favour of many young Germans and, due to their domination on TikTok, the AfD has enjoyed a remarkable success in this round of European general elections. Despite a string of scandals tailing them in the run up, they snatched up 15.90% of the electoral votes, coming in second after the Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschland. Germany’s lowering of the voting age to 16 has further amplified this phenomenon with 17% of 16- to 17-year-olds indicating their support for the AfD.

In an era where the Gen-Z phrase "Ok, Boomer" went viral to dismiss resistance to change, the recent voting patterns of those aged 16-34 are surprisingly counterintuitive. Some may choose to brush it off as a simple question of a generational gap or naiveté in the same way as "Ok, Boomer," but like anything in politics, the outcome is annoyingly complex and as always, something else is lurking under the surface.

According to an EU election survey carried out by the Jacques Delors Institute, 32% of young voters indicated that they prioritized "the fight against poverty," and 29% indicated the same for "boosting the economy and creating new jobs." In the run up to the elections, the Eurobarometer Spring Survey of 2024 further revealed that many Europeans between 18 to 39 years old believe that the situation of their national economy was going to worsen in the coming year. Additionally, 52% of voters aged 18 to 24 and 60% of voters aged 25 to 39, thought thatat the present time, in general, things are going in the wrong direction in their country. Numbers from such surveys can only ever provide a glimpse of the anxiety plaguing the youth, but the Dutch nail it with a single word: bestaansonzekerheid – the insecurity of existence.

The youngest voters, entering adulthood in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic, war in Ukraine, ongoing climate crisis, inflation, and economic disruptions, face distinct challenges. Green parties, although fighting a larger-scale existential threat, fail to resonate with those preoccupied by more micro-level existential threats such as housing shortages, pension cutbacks and other economic struggles. The Greens come off as too lofty and idealistic, perhaps even privileged and Euro-elitist.

A common sentiment among young voters of far-right parties is that worrying about the climate is a privilege. It is a socio-economic privilege to be able to prioritize the planet as much as your next grocery run or gas bill. Such economic anxieties, which stem from the post-pandemic era and the aftermath of the Ukraine War, are effectively leveraged by populist parties, as seen in 2022, when Marine Le Pen promised more student housing and tax cuts for the under-30s.

Indeed, Schmuck and Mattes (2015) attest how young voters have long been targeted by the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs in Austria, where the voting age is 16. They identify how far-right populist parties use economic and cultural-symbolic threats to further gain ground with their youngest and most vulnerable voters. Recent surveys among German youth reveal that economic worries are intertwined with immigration scepticism. Parties like the RN further exploit this by claiming Islamic traditionalism conflicts with LGBTQ+ and women’s rights, framing these as core European values. These cultural ‘threats’ reinforce apprehensions toward immigration by linking economic anxieties with a more abstract and existential cultural angst.

By framing themselves as anti-elitist and in opposition to the parties in government, far-right populist parties tap into the lack of trust and disillusionment that young voters may feel toward institutionalized politics. This allows them to more efficiently polarize the political landscape and mobilize their young voters.

There were, however, several exceptions. Most notable among these were young Italians who continued voting for the center-left in this European Parliament elections.

In a country where the youth remain unimpressed by Meloni’s appeals, young Italian voters have defied expectations by remaining notably loyal to left-leaning green parties. Among those aged 18-30, the center-left Partita Democratico captured 18% of the vote, Alleanza Verdi e Sinistra received 16%, and the Movimento 5 Stelle garnered 17%. This underscores a significant 51% of Italian youth voting with a strong emphasis on environmental issues, sharply distinct from the 14% of youth votes secured by FdI.