Spain's floods: How nepotism left Valencians defenceless

In the aftermath of last week’s catastrophic floods, Valencians are not only struggling through the mud in search of water and food, but are also grappling with the loss of loved ones. Underneath this devastation, a harsher truth emerges: a massive failure of governance. While climate change has exacerbated extreme weather, Valencia’s vulnerability is also a consequence of negligence. Decades of political decisions have prioritized profit over public safety, and in situations like this, we bear the consequences.

A few days before the deluge, the regional government’s main concern was securing the return of the America’s Cup to Valencia, the capital of the Valencian Country, an autonomous region of Spain. The last time the event was held here, in 2007, it cost taxpayers 400 million euros. Tourism is the cornerstone of today’s Generalitat Valenciana. Even on the day disaster struck, officials were busy collecting a sustainable tourism award. Valencia’s current president, the conservative Carlos Mazón, has a mantra: "La Comunitat Valenciana será turística o no será" ("The Valencian Community will be touristic, or it won’t be"). Among Mazón’s team is Councillor Nuria Montes, the former secretary-general of HOSBEC, the Valencian hotel association. The relentless pursuit of profit from tourism, seemingly without limits, has frequently overridden environmental responsibilities. Dunes and farmland that once mitigated flood damage have been stripped away. Since the 1990s, the Popular Party of the Valencian Community (PP) has led this trajectory, with notable figures like Eduardo Zaplana, who rose to power in 1995 and shaped Valencia’s economic and political landscape. Today, many of these officials face corruption charges; in fact, just last week, Zaplana himself was sentenced to ten years in prison. Notably, during Zaplana’s tenure, Carlos Mazón, now president of the Generalitat Valenciana, held a high-ranking position as Director General of Industrial Safety and Consumption.

Valencia’s history of political corruption includes some of Spain’s most infamous scandals, including the Gürtel case —the country’s largest corruption case— with deep ties to Valencia’s PP leadership. Some say corruption has become normalized here to the extent that a popular saying emerged: "La corrupción, como la paella, en ningún sitio como en Valencia" (Corruption, like paella, is nowhere better than in Valencia). While the PP does not represent all of Valencian society at all, its legacy has hit us all.

In 2006, Valencia suffered a metro accident. It was Spain’s deadliest rail disaster. The Valencian government, led by Francisco Camps (PP) attempted to cover up the tragedy to protect their image ahead of a papal visit. Left unsupported by the administration, the victims’ families were forced to organise themselves to demand justice which they ultimately achieved. In response to such neglect, citizens began to refer to the autonomous governing body, the Generalitat Valenciana, as Barbaritat Valenciana (Valencian Barbarity), highlighting the administration’s nepotism. Today, this pattern of neglect seems to persist.

Floods and heavy rains are nothing new in Valencia; poets from Andalusian times recited verses about the dangers of the rising mud. But with climate change intensifying these events, scientists warn that stronger protections are urgently needed. The current administration was previously allied with Vox, a far-right party that denies climate change. Emergency funds allocated for disaster relief by the previous Socialist-Valencianist coalition government, known as the Botànic, have been redirected to support bullfighting, following the wishes of the former Vice President, Vicente Barrera, a bullfighter. This is the same government that has relaxed regulations to allow tourism development even closer to fragile coastlines, reducing the minimum distance for hotel construction to just 200 meters from the shore. Meanwhile, the Barranc de Poio, a semi-arid basin that floods destructively when overwhelmed, has been extensively studied. As early as 2007, The Xúquer Hydrographic Confederation (CHJ) had proposed mitigation plans, but, the Spanish Ministry for Ecological Transition has cited budget constraints as a reason for delaying action, leaving the towns in the county of l'Horta Sud, home to many working-class neighbourhoods in Valencia, unprotected and vulnerable to future floods.

The PP is also a party that actively opposes the linguistics rights of the acknowledged Valencian national minority. Castilian (Spanish) and Valencian—a variety of Catalan, historically known as Valencian by locals for centuries— are the official languages of the Valencian Community. The Valencian PP played a key role in the so-called Battle of València, a cultural identity conflict between two main factions: Pancatalanism, which advocated for closer ties with Catalonia, and Blaverism, a Spanish nationalist movement that claimed Valencian is distinct from Catalan. Ultimately, Blaverism has aimed to undermine Valencia’s already fragile linguistic identity.

I have spent three years visiting various minority groups across Europe, but the PP’s legacy in terms of Valencianophobia —a unique form of hostility toward their own national minority—is unprecedented in Europe. The party abruptly shut down Canal 9, the Valencian public television station, when it became clear they were heading for defeat in the 2014 elections. Under Alberto Fabra’s (PP) government, Valencians were deprived of a crucial source of information in our minoritized language. No other public media outlet in a minority language had experienced such a shutdown. In the past, the PP enacted identity laws that excluded parts of the society, creating a segregating distinction between "good" and "bad" Valencians.

Today, President Mazón’s dismissive comments—"Una lengua (el valenciano) que ha sido impuesta durante demasiado tiempo" ("Valencian is a language that has been imposed for too long")—only deepen the community’s sense of cultural erasure. As we face daily linguistic discrimination, and witness Valencian disappearing from schools. Mazón has introduced measures to discredit the language such as granting Valencian language certificates to anyone who has completed high school, regardless of proficiency. The outlook is certainly troubling if the situation doesn’t change. This administration is also neglecting the centenary commemoration of Vicent Andrés Estellés, one of the most prominent Valencian poets, and revoking all subsidies to media written in Valencian like Camacuc, a local children’s cartoon magazine accused of Catalanist propaganda. Unfortunately, the floods have destroyed Camacuc's headquarters.

Despite flood warnings from the State Meteorological Agency (AEMET), echoed by the University of València and the Diputació de València—whose president, a member of the PP, had instructed employees to leave work at noon—President Mazón’s government failed to take timely action. His first public appearance came at 11:45, and he offered no warnings. Then, at 13:00, Mazón recorded a video announcing that the storm was now heading towards Cuenca, assuring viewers that “nothing is happening here, everything is under control.” The video was later deleted, but by then it had been widely circulated. Consequently, many workers who were unaware of the imminent danger continued at their jobs or ended up trapped in underground parking lots. An emergency alert finally reached everyone’s phones at 20:11, but by then it was far too late. The floods had already passed, leaving thousands stranded.

On the day of the catastrophe, Secretary of Security and Emergencies Emilio Argüeso was notably absent during critical moments. According to official records, he was attending a meeting to organise a bullfighting festival and remained out of contact for the next 24 hours. In the initial days of the crisis, the Valencian government declined assistance offers from other institutions, including Catalans or French firefighting teams. On the other side, Pedro Sánchez and the Spanish government provided resources to the regional government, they refrained from direct intervention.

In response, ordinary Valencians took over. Youth groups coordinated efforts to clear streets and distributed essential supplies. Volunteers coming from across Spain and Europe—firefighters, farmers, and citizens alike—stepped in as it seemed to be the only way to help, given that the local authorities failed to deliver immediate assistance. As Valencians of diverse origins and backgrounds clear the wreckage, side by side with the support of emergency teams, one of the government's responses has been to open a bank account for donations, provoking anger among citizens who already pay taxes and wonder why their contributions aren’t funding effective disaster management. Details on how these donations will be used remain absent. This is the same administration that announced tax cuts for the wealthy, with projections indicating a revenue loss of 495 million euros for the region in 2024.

Across flood-ravaged towns, banners declaring “Sols el poble salva el poble”—“Only the people can save the people”—capture the profound frustration of a community abandoned by its leaders. At the same time, extreme right groups are reportedly eager to exploit the catastrophe for their own gain. The reality is stark: “It’s not easy to be Valencian”. Meanwhile, media outlets based in Madrid continue to portray Valencia merely as a destination known for the sea and paella. Spain’s national news agency, EFE, even published advice on how tourists from Madrid could reach the beach without getting stuck in the flood-stricken areas. If the PP views the Land of Valencia essentially as a tourist playground, it reduces Valencians to mere employees locked in a nightmarish theme park. The question remains: Will this tragedy finally prompt meaningful change, or will the cycle of colonial mismanagement, underfunding, manipulation, and profit-driven priorities leave Valencians exposed once again as the waters inevitably rise?

Note: This article gives the views of the author and does not represent the position of the European Association of Daily Newspapers in Minority and Regional Languages (MIDAS) or Eurac Research.