South Tyrol as a consociational democracy – risks and threats

INTRODUCTION

South Tyrol’s autonomy model and the way in which its ethnic conflict has been successfully resolved are studied with international interest (Benedikter 2009). The political consociational model (Lijphart 1977), with which South Tyrol’s ethnic-centrifugal forces have been tamed, is also attracting interest in the context of international comparisons (Alber 2021; Alber/Pallaver 2021; Carlà 2018; Larin/Röggla 2019; Pallaver 2014; Wolff 2008).

Just as in the past, research has almost exclusively been conducted on advancing European integration process, but not on possible phases of its disintegration (Scheller/Eppler 2013), the South Tyrolean autonomy model has so far tended to avoid the question: Is a relapse from this positive development possible?

This rather general outline of the problem is dedicated to the questions of such risks and threats. However, a more in-depth investigation would be needed to answer these questions. The thesis put forward here is that potential crisis factors from outside and/or from within can weaken or even destroy the concordance model.

In analyzing this reverse path from the increasing consolidation of consociational democracy, to which the political system of South Tyrol corresponds, to its weakening and even potential failure, I draw on the organizational sociological approach of Hirschmann (1970), who attempts to explain in three courses of action “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty” how organizations behave when there is a decline in organizational performance caused by exogenous (e.g. external efficiency pressures) and/or endogenous (e.g. wrong decisions arising internally) influences.

The consequences can manifest themselves in three ways: in the dissolution of the relationship to the organization (exit), in the attempt to change the organization through appropriate measures (voice), and thereby to support and consolidate it again (loyalty) (Hirschmann 1970, pp. 76–105).

In these remarks I concentrate on the dissolution or at least a retreat from the “organization” of consociational democracy in an ethnically fragmented society, using the example of South Tyrol.

The risks and threats inherent in consociational democracies, including that of South Tyrol, comprise two dimensions. The external dimension affects the consociational model from the outside. This includes international (Europe) and national (Italy/Austria) developments. The internal dimension comprises three levels: At the macro level, the political system; at the meso level, the parties and associations; and at the micro-level, civil society.

The basic prerequisite for the functioning of consociational democracy (Köppl/Kranenpohl 2012) is a climate of tolerance, dialogue, the ability to compromise, so-called “institutional equality.” Disturbances from outside or inside can impair this equality and damage or even destroy the consociational model.

EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS

South Tyrol’s autonomy is embedded in an international legal network that provides security for the German- and Ladin-speaking minority. The 1946 Treaty of Paris, the basis of autonomy, was reliant on an international commitment between Austria and Italy, which was confirmed in 1992 in the two countries’ declaration of settlement of disputes before the UN (Dispute resolution), further strengthening international protection (di Michele/Palermo/Pallaver2003). Austria and Italy, both members of the EU, have taken on additional obligations to protect minorities through EU law in general as well as by acceding to international agreements, e.g., the European Convention on Human Rights.

The Dispute resolution no longer allows for unilateral steps in minority protection and territorial autonomy, which in and of themselves can only ever be set by consensus between Vienna and Rome (Denicolò/Pallaver 2018, p. 267). In addition, the EU integration process has had a lasting impact on the nation states and has led to a European democracy of negotiation and a culture of compromise.

International crises can affect the stability of relations between both ethnic majorities and minorities. A profound crisis within the European Union could deprive the minority of “security”. Such a profound, system-eroding crisis of the EU is conceivable with the revival of nation-statehood. Hungary and Poland are examples of this. If sovereignism were to prevail in Italy as the antithesis of a supranational perspective, an Italexit would be conceivable. If this were to happen, it could lead to a deep cleavage between EU supporters and EU opponents, as in Scotland with Brexit. An ethnic front between the traditionally pro-EU-oriented ethnic minority and the more nationally oriented Italian-speaking population in South Tyrol is conceivable. The German-speaking population could demand a return to Austria on the grounds of wanting to remain part of the EU. This EU cleavage would place a heavy burden on the consociational model and inspire exit strategies.

In addition to the EU dimension, sovereignism, which revalues the state as the primary actor, could call into question South Tyrol’s territorial autonomy up to and including the protection of minorities or parts of it. However, there could also be a conflict between centre (Rome) and periphery (Bozen-Bolzano) if South Tyrol wanted to expand its “full autonomy” and become a “state within a state” which would go against the will of the central state and as a result be opposed by it.

Conversely, Austria could also play a negative role as the kin state of the minority. If a right-wing populist, strongly nationalistic government were to take the reigns of the state in Austria, it would be conceivable that Vienna would mobilize South Tyrol’s ethnic minority to demand a return to Austria. This development would also strongly promote ethnic polarization. A strong secessionist movement would not only lead to a deep cleavage between the language groups but would fundamentally call into question trust among the language groups and thus the cooperative consociational model. Such deep cleavage and mistrust between language groups was experienced by South Tyrol at the time of terrorism in the 1960s, while in the 1980s there were terrorist attacks by groups from both language groups (Peterlini 2005). Austria’s offer to German- and Ladin-speaking South Tyroleans as Italian citizens to obtain an Austrian passport, points to such kin state initiatives and has done little to foster trust among language groups (Haller/Atz/Pallaver 2020).

Such external factors, with the exception of the double passport that has since been shelved, may seem to be inconceivable South Tyrol at present. Developments in other European countries, however, prove that political turnarounds can often occur more quickly than expected, for example in Scotland, Catalonia or Ossetia.

INTERNAL DIMENSIONS

Deficits and distortions of the South Tyrolean consociational democracy-model have been pointed out in the past (Pallaver 2008). This concerns the four principles on which the political system of South Tyrol is based: 1. Participation of the three recognized language groups in political decision-making processes. 2. Decision-making autonomy of the respective language group in matters pertaining to questions that are not of common interest. 3. Proportional representation of each language group in political organs, in the recruitment of personnel within the public sector (ethnic quota system) and in the allocation of public funds. 4. Veto right of the respective language group in the defense of central interests of group protection.

The proportional representation of the language groups in decision-making bodies, primarily in the provincial government, has always been formally guaranteed, even though the Ladin speaking minority does not have full equal rights here. However, if, as has happened in social reality, the majority of Italians vote for an anti- or semi-system party with which the German-speaking parties cannot and/or do not want to enter a coalition, the possibility of parties becoming government partners that do not by any means represent the majority of the language group is likely/inevitable, as was the case from 1993–2018, even if ethnic representation was preserved. Another scenario could be that the coalition partner is so weak, politically and by numbers, that the interests of one language group could easily be promoted to the detriment of other groups interests. This applies, for example, to the Lega, which has hardly been politically present in the current legislative period (2018–2023) and has little ability to assert itself.

Although the decision-making autonomy of the respective language groups exists as a political claim, majority decisions are made by the government, so that one language group can also block the justified interests of others. This was the case, for example, when the Italian coalition partner wanted to introduce a bilingual school for its own language group, but the German coalition partner SVP, which had a majority, voted against it.

The Autonomy Statute rule, that public resources (public offices, public funds, proportional representation of language groups in political bodies) are distributed on the basis of the strength of the respective language groups, has some pitfalls. The ethnic proportional quota shifts the competition for certain positions towards the respective language group. The problem now is that merit is relativized in these competitions because the size of the language group means that the smaller one sometimes loses out on better qualified candidates due to the smaller number of posts. This can lead to tensions, as was already the case in the past when ethnic proportional quota system was strongly questioned, especially by the Italian side. Ethnic proportional representation is linked to the declaration of language group affiliation, which excludes all citizens who do not ‘belong’ to the three language groups recognized by the Statute of Autonomy, unless these “others” subordinate themselves to one of the three language groups (language group assignment) (Piacentini 2021). So far, there have been no conflicts in the proportional distribution of resources because there has been no financial shortage. However, this could very well occur if the overall economic conditions change, and one language group is privileged over the other. However, this could also happen outside the proportional representation system as a result of the ethnic division of labor that still exists (Pircher/Preglau 2016).

The veto right of the language groups has to this day remained a blunt weapon because the procedure required to apply it is extremely complicated. However, it contains explosive power because it can also lead to the blocking of decision-making processes.

All these deficiencies have not posed a destabilizing threat to the consociational system to date because the system is flexible, discriminated groups are relatively small (ethnic refusers of language group affiliation, the Ladin speaking minority) and soft solutions of adaptation have been found (e.g., credit system in filling public posts, privatization of public services). Moreover, South Tyrol is one of the 25 richest regions in Europe and one of the richest in Italy, so in view of these advantages no one seriously questions the current consociational model. But in times of crisis, these weaknesses could become more pronounced and lead to ethnic tensions.

Quite fundamentally, consociational democratic systems, not only in South Tyrol, can suffer from a lack of competition. The maximum involvement of all actors in the government inevitably leads to a marginalization of the opposition which could endanger the transparency of decision-making, exacerbate the lack of publicity and camaraderie, to name but a few examples. Therefore, in these systems, there is all the more need for direct democratic corrections to the representative consociational system.

Recently, various authors have addressed the crisis of democracy and the danger of its potential to be undermined from within. This thesis can also be applied in a modified way to consociational democracy in ethnically fragmented societies such as in South Tyrol.

Today, attacks on democracy increasingly arise from the actions of duly elected governments, not coup plotters. For example, Haggard and Kaufmann (2021) examine the processes by which elected leaders weaken checks on executive power, curtail fundamental freedoms and undermine the integrity of the electoral system. They consider three interrelated causal links: the harmful effects of polarization, the realignment of the party system, and the incremental growth of exceptionalism. Levitsky and Zoblatt (2018) argue similarly. Governing elites, and this also applies to South Tyrol, play a central role in this.

Thus, political leaders of the respective language groups could rekindle nationalism and strengthen the ethnic unity of the language groups. There are enough examples of this in Europe, think of Northern Ireland, Catalonia, Corsica or Abkhazia. As a model of thought for South Tyrol, it would be possible, for example, for the head of government (executive) of the Germans as the larger language group, who would also have a majority in the provincial parliament behind him, to gradually dismantle the controls and above all, the balances between the language groups, with the complicity of the elites in the provincial parliament (legislature). Inter-ethnic cooperation, which has increased in recent years, would again be replaced by strict ethnic separation. Conversely, such a development could also be initiated by the Italian state with the dismantling of minority rights.

It would also be conceivable to interpret the four basic principles of concordance democracy in favor of one language group, for example by bending the law (e.g. negation of the right of veto), the uncompromising application of majority voting in the provincial government; perforation of the ethnic quota system through constant exceptions or the non-observance or circumvention of the ethnic quota system by the state, as sometimes happened in the past when filling state positions; systematic marginalization of the weaker language group (e.g. making the threshold for a provincial parliament mandate more difficult, as was attempted with the introduction of a basic mandate to the disadvantage of the Ladin speaking minority, overturned by the Constitutional Court; Willeit 2020, pp. 44–45), or one-sided political decisions, e.g. by drawing up a provincial budget to the clear disadvantage of one language group.

The exercise of governmental power in parallel with the polarisation of the ethnically divided society, corresponds to the polarization of the parties (Pallaver 2018). The party system, potentially characterized by anti-, semi- and secessionist parties, would undermine the common basis for discussion and work. Flexibility, compromise, pact-based legislation, etc. would be impossible to implement under such a party system. It would be likely that parallel to the party system, the association system would also follow the logic of ethnic polarization. Furthermore, it cannot be ruled out that in an ethnically polarized climate, institutions could fail and checks and balances could falter.

The “illiberal” leaders are supported by the public, especially by the media and instead of fulfilling their peacemaking function, the media tend to fuel polarity within the ethnic climate and widen the cleavages between language groups (Pallaver 2006). Particularly negative experiences in this regard had already occurred in the 1950s and 1960s.

The polarization and deep ethnic cleavages in society may result in both sides resorting to an exit strategy. The German language group could demand self-determination, either towards a Free State, as the Freedom Party demands, or by returning to Austria, itself a demand of South Tyrolean Freedom Party. The Italian language group could pursue internal Italian self-determination, with the demand for a dominant return of the state in South Tyrol.

The greatest threat for the consociational democracy of South Tyrol is nationalism, which undermines “institutional equality” and also includes the recognition and personal dignity of the other and its identity. The “disagio degli italiani” (unease of the Italians), for example , is an expression of this hurt at not being recognized as equals by the other language groups. The subject of toponomastics or the double passport are two elements that have left such injuries. Scars of such hurts can still be seen many years later.

In addition to the institutional, there are social weaknesses that can have a negative impact on the peaceful coexistence of society if politicians do not take the signs seriously. This concerns, on the one hand, the reproduction of social inequality (especially of women), the development of family structures and gender relations (e.g., poverty risk of single parents, old-age provision, care), migrants (integration into a multilingual society), social capital (significantly higher among German and Ladin speakers, less among Italians) (Pallaver/Haller/Atz 2016, pp. 395–399).

CONCLUSIONS

South Tyrol’s consociational democracy functions relatively well and with relatively little conflict due to the flexibility and willingness of its actors to adapt and to the progressive development of a culture of coexistence, even if the ethnic cleavages are still present and yet to be overcome. South Tyrol’s society has also developed positively also thanks to good economic prosperity, from which all language groups have benefited (Larch 2012). A large majority sees added value in the consolidated autonomy, in the protection of minorities and in the coexistence of the language groups. This is related, among other things, to a responsible, above all political, but also economic and cultural elite as well as to an efficient administration and trust in its institutions and (today somewhat less) in politics that has developed as a result.

Nevertheless, threats and risks should not be underestimated, eyes should not be closed to the weaknesses of an institutional and social dimension as well as potentially negative political developments. As can be seen from other areas with different ethnic or confessional minorities, “institutional equality” can also shift quite quickly with the consequence that the call for “exit” from the consociational model becomes louder.

In order to be able to counter such potential negative developments from the very beginning, prevention is needed. We have seen that, for example, the British Brexit has reinvigorated almost overnight, and regardless of the painstakingly achieved Good Friday Agreement of 1998, new violence within the Northern Irish conflict (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2021).

Therefore, preventive measures should be taken for potential crises. Crisis prevention can be understood as a systematic and forward-looking effort by political actors to prevent crises that are about to become violent, or as a contribution to the transformation of violent conflicts towards a peaceful solution (Rotberg/Rabb 1989). In South Tyrol, the aim is not to prevent potentially violent conflicts, but primarily to prevent ethnic escalations, which in extreme cases can also lead to violence. The instruments to be considered are a combination of operational and structural prevention measures. Operational prevention focuses on short-term measures to prevent and, if necessary, reverse conflict escalation. This includes mediation offers, incentives, sanctions and more.

Structural prevention focuses on medium to long-term measures to eliminate the problems at their roots. Crisis prevention is successful when there is the capacity to act, when there is knowledge of the cause-effect relationships and when concrete starting points for overcoming crises are identified. In South Tyrol, a prevention task force should therefore be set up in order to be able to intervene when there are signs of serious conflicts. As an accompanying measure, crisis monitoring should also be set up.

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