On December 1, 2024, the European Commission officially began the new institutional cycle that will end in 2029. It did so with the weakest parliamentary majority on record since the Maastricht Treaty, when the European Parliament began participating in the process of appointing commissioners.

How did the process of appointing the new Commission unfold? As is known, and despite the fact that the Lisbon Treaty provided the possibility to reduce the Commission to a number of members equivalent to two-thirds of the Member States (ex Article 17.5 TEU), by virtue of the decision European Council of May 22, 2013 (which reaffirmed its position of December 2008), the Commission continues to be composed of a number of members equal to the number of Member States. The appointment process unfolds as follows (ex Article 17.7 TEU): After the European Parliament elections (held between June 6 and 9, 2024), on June 27, 2024, the European Council proposed Ursula Von der Leyen as the candidate to preside over the European Commission (European Council Decision (EU) 2024/1862)¹. According to Article 128 of the European Parliament's Rules of Procedure (EP-ROP), once the European Council proposes a candidate, the President of the European Parliament (in this case, Maltese Roberta Metsola) must invite said candidate to make a statement and present their political orientation to the Parliament. After a debate, a secret vote is held, and the candidate will be elected by a majority of the members. The debate and vote took place on July 18. Von der Leyen received the support of 401 MEPs, while 284 voted against, and 15 abstained. In principle, she was supported by the Popular, Socialist, and Liberal groups—the traditionally pro-European forces of Parliament, the driving force. However, not all members of these groups voted in favor. At the same time, approximately forty MEPs from the Greens group supported Von der Leyen. It should be noted that the MEPs of the Fratelli d’Italia party, integrated into the ECR Conservative group, voted against her re-election, aligning with the majority of their group. Also opposing the re-election were far-left groups and the far-right groups Patriots for Europe (which includes Fidesz, led by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán; Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National; and Vox, among others) and Europe of Nations (whose main force is Alternative für Deutschland). The current European Parliament is a particularly fragmented chamber. The traditional hegemony between the Popular and Socialist parties, a product of the consensus born after World War II, has not disappeared but is particularly weakened. The EU is not immune to the winds of polarization sweeping through the Member States.

The appointment of the other commissioners formally corresponds to the Council, in agreement with the elected President Von der Leyen—a decision that was made on September 19, 2024 (European Council Decision (EU) 2024/2517). However, in reality, each Member State proposes a commissioner of their nationality and negotiates the portfolio to be assumed. Subsequently, the European Parliament must approve the Commission as a whole. Before the vote, each of the commissioner-designates proposed jointly by the Council and the President-elect is invited by the President of the European Parliament to appear before the relevant parliamentary committees in a public hearing. In this hearing, the candidate is invited to make a statement and answer questions from the members of the said committee (ex Article 129 EP-ROP). These hearings took place between November 4 and 12, 2024.

The competence and independence of the candidates, as well as their knowledge of the portfolio for which they have been proposed, are evaluated by the relevant parliamentary committee, which issues a statement. Although this qualification is not binding—since the European Parliament cannot individually veto a candidate—it can have political effects, as has happened in the past. Thus, for example, the negative qualifications of Rocco Buttiglione in 2004 and Alenka Bratušek in 2014 led to the withdrawal and replacement of the candidates to allow for the approval of the Commission as a whole.

The team of commissioners presented by President Von der Leyen can be considered predominantly center-right, although she appointed former Socialist Minister Teresa Ribera as the first executive vice-president in charge of Clean, Just, and Competitive Transition. This appointment destabilized the Commission proposal, as Spanish MEPs from the Popular group (EPP) in the European Parliament attempted to convince their colleagues to threaten a vote against the Commission unless former Minister Ribera, questioned for her actions during the storm that devastated the Valencian Community on October 29, 2024, was replaced. The European Popular Party (EPP) exerted pressure, but the Spanish Prime Minister refused to replace her, and negotiations concluded when the Socialist group in Parliament, initially opposed, accepted the agreement not to withdraw former Minister Ribera in exchange for the candidacy of Raffaele Fitto, commissioner-designate and executive vice-president, who until then had been Italy's Minister of EU Affairs and the South in Giorgia Meloni’s government. Fitto's election as one of the six executive vice-presidents represents a significant victory for Italy and its Prime Minister, as he is considered a close confidant. It also means that the so-called "cordon sanitaire" that the left had sought to impose on a candidate from Fratelli d’Italia could not be established (his candidacy was accepted, but it was rejected that he occupy such a relevant position in the Commission). The "Ribera crisis" has had several consequences, the effects of which remain to be seen, including within the EPP.

On November 27, 2024, 370 MEPs voted in favor of the proposed College of Commissioners. This represents just 51.4% of the chamber, the worst historical record², and indicates that the President-elect lost 31 votes since July—a rare occurrence, as the collective vote for the Commission usually secured greater support than the vote for the President-elect alone.

Although the traditionally pro-European forces in the European Parliament (the Populars, Socialists, Liberals, and Greens, totaling 475 votes)³ still hold a comfortable majority (which, however, has been progressively shrinking in each successive European Parliament election), an alternative majority called the "Venezuela majority"⁴ has also emerged. This majority of center-right and right-wing forces corresponds to the combined votes of the EPP, ECR, Patriots for Europe, and Europe of Nations (375 votes, exceeding the simple majority). The current distribution of seats places the EPP group in a position of strength, as it can lead the only two possible majorities. President Von der Leyen, if she wishes to advance her proposals, will have to pay more attention to the EPP. Despite belonging to the same political family, during the previous term, she demonstrated greater alignment with the Socialist and Green groups in the European Parliament. Recall the personal clash between EPP leader Manfred Weber and President Von der Leyen, whose tense relations date back to 2018–2019 when, despite Weber being chosen as Spitzenkandidat, Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron ultimately opted for Von der Leyen to lead the European Commission.

On July 18, 2024, President-elect Von der Leyen published the document "Political Guidelines" for the new institutional cycle and explained its content in the plenary session of the European Parliament in which her re-election was approved. The document outlines the Commission's priorities, divided into five parts: i) sustainable competitiveness and prosperity; ii) defense and security; iii) strengthening the European social model; iv) democracy and values; and v) global Europe. When asked, Von der Leyen summarizes the priorities in three big ideas: prosperity, security, and democracy.

Regarding competitiveness, the new slogan, which replaces the well-known "Green Deal,” is the “Clean Industrial Deal." There is a greater emphasis on competitiveness, although it is promised that environmental policies will not be abandoned. Decarbonization and reindustrialization are the new priorities of the community executive, along with reducing dependence on Chinese industry. The need to simplify bureaucracy, a significant burden for European companies, is also emphasized.

In terms of defense and security, one of the first figures highlighted in the document stands out: while the EU’s combined defense spending increased by 20% between 1999 and 2021, in the same period, spending in Russia grew by 300% and in China by 600%. Additionally, defense efforts remain excessively national, with barely any European perspective. The Commission seems determined to change this: "We need to spend more, spend better, spend together." It is likely that the demands of the new Trump administration will make both an increase in spending and greater European cooperation in this area inevitable.

Regarding the European social model, the Commission intends to implement a "European Affordable Housing Plan." In fact, for the first time, a Commissioner will assume a portfolio in which housing is a specific area of work ("Energy and Housing"), even though European competences in this matter are not entirely clear.

On democracy, the Commission insists on the danger posed by disinformation promoted by foreign actors and the need to continue strengthening the rule of law: "Europe’s democracy and economy rely on the rule of law."

When addressing the EU’s global position, the document reiterates the necessity of continuing to support Ukraine (already mentioned in the section on defense and security): "Ukraine is fighting for our freedom every day – and we must work for its freedom too." Strengthening relations with the United Kingdom is also foreseen, and enlargement towards the Balkans is presented as a geopolitical imperative, although no specific date is set.

The geopolitical context facing the Commission at the start of this new institutional cycle is challenging. The new European Commission has the weakest parliamentary support in history, with a European Parliament that is more fragmented than ever and where Euroscepticism has gained ground. It must prioritize enhancing competitiveness without completely abandoning the environmental agenda while simultaneously reducing dependency on Chinese markets. Additionally, this second term cannot rely on the traditional Franco-German axis, as Berlin faces a power vacuum pending new elections in February 2025, with the formation of a government expected to take several more months, while France has been mired in instability following the motion of no confidence against Prime Minister Barnier. This instability is likely to persist until the end of President Macron’s term in 2027. The Commission is also holding its breath awaiting the final results in Romania, which could potentially become another pro-Russian member state within European institutions.

The EU finds itself in a multipolar world characterized by increasing military conflicts and trends of isolationism and protectionism, in other words, the resurgence of nationalism. If this were not enough, the next institutional cycle coincides with a new term for President Trump, whose unpredictability almost certainly entails reduced American support for European defense. Additionally, the new Commission will likely need to manage the conclusion of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and monitor the regime change in Syria, with all the risks it entails. The ongoing Middle East conflict between Israel and neighboring countries remains a latent issue, although the fall of Bashar al-Assad may weaken Iran, one of their primary allies.

Faced with so many uncertainties, it would be advisable for the Commission to strive to act as a driving force for integration and unity. It is well known in Brussels that President Von der Leyen did not maintain smooth or cordial relations with the previous President of the European Council, Charles Michel, nor with the previous High Representative, Josep Borrell. Her less collaborative style, her expansive interpretation of the Commission’s competences, and the centralization of power around herself may not help President Von der Leyen in this second cycle, where European unity, including within its institutions and among its main leaders, will be fundamental. Europe was built on consensus and agreement, as well as strong leadership. It would be wise not to forget this in the turbulent years ahead.