On February 23, 2025, Germany held federal elections, in which the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU), led by its chancellor candidate Friedrich Merz, won the majority of votes. Just five days later, negotiations for a coalition with the SPD initiated, with expectations that both parties would finalize the agreement before Easter. The new federal government faces significant international and domestic challenges in a rapidly changing environment.

For decades, German foreign and security policy has been shaped by the country’s traditional role as a civil power. However, in recent years, this approach has been challenged by shifting dynamics both domestically and internationally. On the global stage, Germany is increasingly expected to take on greater responsibility, while internally, its foreign and security policy environment has become more constrained.¹ Moreover, traditional foreign policy – characterized by skepticism toward military intervention and a strong focus on multilateral cooperation and international law – has proven less effective in addressing current challenges.² For example, in recent years, the federal government has either abstained from key EU Council decisions or abruptly changed its stance. Disagreements within the "traffic light” coalition over issues such as the Supply Chain Act, the ban on combustion engines, and the AI Act have spilled over into the EU, weakening Germany’s ability to take decisive action.

The gap between international expectations, internal constraints, and the declining effectiveness of traditional policy tools has widened significantly since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Tensions and contradictions between political parties regarding the direction of foreign policy have intensified.³ Following Russia’s attack on Ukraine, Chancellor Olaf Scholz declared before the Bundestag on February 27, 2022, that Europe was experiencing a "Zeitenwende" (turning point) with drastic consequences for the economy, society, politics, and, especially, for Germany’s defense and security policies.

With the beginning of Donald Trump’s second term as U.S. president, the geopolitical landscape has changed rapidly and dramatically. A speech by the new U.S. Vice President, J.D. Vance, at the Munich Security Conference in February 2025 highlighted the growing disconnect between Europe and the United States in assessing global threats. According to Vance, Europe is even retreating from some of the fundamental values it once shared with the United States.

During the same Munich Security Conference, which took place in the midst of the German election campaign, Friedrich Merz stated: "I agree with those who call for German leadership, and frankly, I am ready to take on this role because I see that Germany holds a strategic position at the heart of Europe; many things in Europe depend on Germany." Following the election, which was heavily influenced by foreign and security policy issues, Merz reaffirmed his commitment to European unity, saying: "We are under massive pressure, and my top priority is to create unity in Europe." He continued: "My absolute priority will be to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible so that, step by step, we can truly achieve independence from the U.S. [...] after Donald Trump's statements, it is clear that the Americans, or at least this administration, are largely indifferent to Europe’s fate."

Shortly before the elections, Merz – who began his political career in Brussels and Strasbourg as a Member of the European Parliament (1989–1994) – outlined his vision for foreign and European policy in a lecture at the Körber Foundation in Berlin as part of the Global Leaders Dialogues. Since there was no coalition agreement defining the general lines of foreign policy at the time of writing, this lecture serves as the best source for analyzing the future European policy of the German government.

For Merz, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is not just a "Zeitenwende", but a historic rupture. One of the central tasks of the next German federal government will be to ensure that the EU not only survives this crisis but emerges from it stronger and more united. According to Merz, in the systemic conflict between liberal democracies and illiberal autocracies, the liberal democratic way of life must prove its worth in global competition. However, it is also evident that the entire framework of foreign and security policy must be revised. Merz proposes a three-step policy shift: first, restoring Germany’s full capacity for action in foreign, security, and European policy; second, rebuilding trust with global partners and allies; and third, defining strategic priorities and implementing them consistently.

To strengthen internal coordination, the creation of a National Security Council within the Federal Chancellery is planned. This council will include federal ministers responsible for internal and external security, representatives of the federal states (Länder), and key security authorities.

Improving coordination on European policy is also part of the federal government’s decision-making adaptation. Merz appears determined to assume a leadership role in Europe, a message that resonates with many European leaders. Many expect the head of government of the EU’s most populous and economically powerful member state to take on this responsibility. This leadership does not necessarily have to involve all EU member states but could also be achieved within a core group of nations. Merz’s alignment with the European Commission President and Manfred Weber, the leader of the EPP parliamentary group, strengthens this position. The Christian Democratic party family in Europe, with eleven heads of government and state, already holds a majority in the European Council. Initial areas of focus would be more efficient and stricter asylum and migration policies. While climate action remains a priority, greater consideration will be given to economic needs in the green transition.

Regarding the EU Defense Commissioner’s proposal to create a European defense fund, Merz emphasizes the need to restructure European defense systems. Maintaining and expanding an independent defense industry is a strategic priority for Europe. However, he has a different perspective on the root causes of Europe’s defense capability issues, arguing that these cannot be solved simply with more funding. Before money can have a real impact, Merz insists on fundamental reforms in European and national military procurement. His approach focuses on simplification, standardization, and leveraging economies of scale in defense investments. He highlights that while NATO’s European members operate 178 different weapons systems, the U.S. has only 30. Europe has 17 different main battle tanks and 29 types of frigates and destroyers–redundancies that cost vast sums and waste potential. With a "Made in Europe" initiative, Merz aims to bring the quality and scale of European defense manufacturing closer to that of the U.S. In this context, a European defense union could include non-EU NATO members such as Turkey, Canada, and the United Kingdom.

However, the future chancellor faces a challenging domestic economic situation and significant infrastructure investment needs. Additionally, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Die Linke could block constitutional reforms requiring a two-thirds parliamentary majority. To circumvent this, the CDU and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) reached an agreement on March 4 to reform Germany’s debt limit, excluding defense expenditures exceeding one percent of GDP. To stimulate the economy, a special fund of 500 billion euros will be created for the next 10 years, financed through loans, for infrastructure projects. This fund will be enshrined in the Constitution, making it exempt from debt restrictions. On the 13th and 18th of March, the current Bundestag will convene to approve a constitutional amendment with a two-thirds majority. CDU and SPD hope to gain the support of the Greens despite opposition from the FDP. Moreover the CDU and SPD want to push through a reform of the debt brake in the newly elected Bundestag by the end of the year.

Regarding bilateral relations, Merz aims to strengthen ties with Germany’s most important neighbors: Poland and France. Poland and Eastern European nations criticized the delayed delivery of battle tanks to Ukraine and Chancellor Scholz’s refusal to supply Taurus missiles to Kyiv. Merz is open to their delivery, provided European partners agree. Additionally, relations with France need renewal and to be deepened. In recent years, Germany and France have often taken opposing positions in the European Council, and Macron’s EU reform proposals were met with silence from Berlin. Given his close personal ties to France, Merz has already stated his intention to use the remaining two years of Macron’s presidency to realize a vision of a sovereign Europe – including enhanced defense cooperation and European nuclear protection.

The new German government faces substantial domestic and international challenges, but as has been emphasized multiple times, strengthening the European Union – both in defense and economy – will be a top priority.