Echoes of Empire: The Resilience of Russian in Central Asia

Treats or threat: Russian policy in Central Asia

Central Asia acts as a buffer zone between Russia and other major powers, particularly China and the West. Maintaining influence in Central Asia allows Russia to prevent other powers from gaining a foothold near its borders, while enhancing its strategic depth. Additionally, Central Asia is vital to Russian foreign policy, providing a geographic and economic bridge between Europe and Asia.

The linguistic strategies employed by the Russian Federation as a form of soft power to enhance the effectiveness of Russian foreign policy, particularly in the nearby regions. This represents a symbolic return of the Russian culture to former Soviet region, a shift in Russia’s foreign policy, and increased activity in almost every sector of Central Asia. Language serves as both a cornerstone for internal cohesion within the multi-ethnic Russian state and as a tool for asserting Russian political agency globally. Geopolitical influence of Russia through language encompasses various activities, such as legal mechanisms, media leverage, cultural endeavors and institutional support.

Furthermore, a process of Creolization is persisting, blending dominant and native cultures. In post-Soviet nations, Russian culture’s dominance remains prestigious, serving as a social and political positioning tool.

However, despite the historical background and current Russian political instruments, the once-dominant Russian language is now experiencing a gradual decline in influence across the region. For instance, in 2023, Kyrgyzstan enacted a law requiring all state employees to pass a Kyrgyz language proficiency test, reinforcing the primacy of Kyrgyz in public administration. Moreover, the same laws were adopted in other Central Asian countries. Therefore, while Russian continues to play a role, particularly in urban areas and certain sectors, the overall trend indicates a decline in its dominance. As Central Asian republics navigate their post-Soviet identities, the balance between Russian and native languages will continue to evolve, reflecting broader socio-political transformations.

Linguistic leverage in geopolitics

One of the significant achievements of Russian foreign policy has been the strategic creation of a tool that uses linguistics to create/encourage geopolitical influence which aims to re-establish Russian as a global lingua franca and compete against English and French in international communication. These efforts are driven by initiatives to implement post-Soviet consolidation projects, integrate ethnic Russians and cultural communities, lobby for language preferences in Central Asian countries, develop language promotion organizations, and combat anti-Russian sentiments.

Russian media, including television, radio, and digital content, maintains a strong presence in Central Asia: remain connecting Russian and Russian-language culture to the media. According to a study by the Eurasian Monitor agency, half of the population in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and 66% of residents in Kazakhstan read the Russian press at least occasionally, with Russian-language publications being widely accessible. Only 5% of Tajik, 18% of Kyrgyz, and 1% of Kazakh respondents reported a lack of Russian-language press in their area. Russian print media holds a significant share of the media market in Central Asia. Therefore, it is evident that in combination, the infosphere in former Soviet states is primarily dominated by Russian language platforms through which pro-Russian propaganda and coverage of world politics through a Russian prism are carried out. This inevitably forms a certain worldview among the target audience.

Why to learn Russian today?

Since the collapse of the USSR 33 years ago, Russian remains the common language of communication in Central Asia, particularly in urban areas. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan stand out in this regard, not only due to their larger Russian populations but also because of the high degree of Russification among the titular ethnic groups.

Despite a general decline in the popularity of Russian in Central Asia’s educational sector, it remains the dominant second language after the titular languages. The number of Russian speakers fell from 119 million in 1990 to 79.3 million in 2018. However, the large population growth in Central Asia, especially Uzbekistan which accounts for nearly 50% of the region’s population increase from 1992 to 2020, the influx of Central Asian migrants to Russia which amounted to 3.47 million in 2022 and parents’ eagerness to enrol their children in Russian-language schools all strengthen the position of the Russian language.

Russia’s geopolitical approach focuses on several other key initiatives to promote the Russian language in Central Asia. These include the establishment of a system for international Russian language school Olympiads and the regulation of content in school textbooks and curricula. Additionally, the strategy aims to promote Russian language learning across all educational levels by increasing the number of schools offering Russian language programs and expanding the availability of Russian language classes. Furthermore, a Russian language global distance-learning program will be launched, targeting both the Russian diaspora and individuals from other nationalities interested in learning the language. The plan also facilitates opportunities for Russian-speaking students from post-Soviet states to pursue higher education at Russian universities, both domestically and internationally.

The collapse of the “Russian world” or new beginnings?

In Central Asia, the overall proficiency in Russian has decreased with its use becoming less frequent among residents. Nevertheless, Russian continues to play a crucial role in the region. It remains a language of daily communication and serves as a lingua franca, particularly in urban areas. Additionally, Russian is integral to high culture, science, prestigious education, media, and the entertainment industry. The number of individuals who use Russian intensively, greatly exceeds the population of ethnic Russians in Central Asia. Moreover, even state policies that are sometimes antagonistic toward the Russian language have not succeeded in fully displacing it from its established niche.

However, the situation is nuanced, with ongoing efforts to balance the use of Russian with the promotion and preservation of native languages. The future of native languages in Central Asia will likely depend on the effectiveness of language policies, cultural initiatives, and societal attitudes towards bilingualism and multilingualism. The future of the Russian language in Central Asia hinges on several scenarios, natural demographic changes to name one. The share of ethnic Russians in the population of Central Asia has been declining for several decades and these Russian populations are an aging ethnic group, with an average age of 38-40 years. The logic of this scenario is that the influence of the Russian language fades away along with the Russian ethnicity.

Another scenario is the intensification of politically radical movements which lobby national language and strengthen the self-identity of a particular country thus banning the Russian language and limiting the range of its application as was in the case in Turkmenistan, where a key aspect of Turkmenistan’s language policy in the 1990s was the Turkmenization of the country’s political and social life. This was done by displacing the Russian language from all spheres and restricting the study and use of Russian language by national minorities, including a ban on the creation of national-cultural organizations.

And though these may be vague trends in the development of the status of the Russian language, what is clear however, is that the role of the Russian language in the Central Asian region is indisputable – not only within the framework of the historical past but also the in the present economic and social development of the region and this position is most likely secured for the near future.